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Abstract—The reliance on deep learning algorithms has grown
significantly in recent years. Yet, these models are highly vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks, which introduce visually imper-
ceptible perturbations into testing data to induce misclassifica-
tions. The literature has proposed several methods to combat
such adversarial attacks, but each method either fails at high
perturbation values, requires excessive computing power, or
both. This letter proposes a computationally efficient method for
defending the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) adversarial attack by
simultaneously denoising and compressing data. Specifically, our
proposed defense relies on training a fully connected multi-layer
Denoising Autoencoder (DAE) and using its encoder as a defense
against the adversarial attack. Our results show that using this
dimensionality reduction scheme is not only highly effective in
mitigating the effect of the FGS attack in multiple threat models,
but it also provides a 2.43x speedup in comparison to defense
strategies providing similar robustness against the same attack.
Index Terms—Adversarial attacks, artificial neural networks,
denoising autoencoders, dimensionality reduction, deep learning
security.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE recent emergence of adversarial machine learningattacks has exposed the vulnerability of artificial neural
networks [1]. These attacks consist of corrupted data samples,
termed adversarial examples, which are constructed by adding
visually imperceptible errors into testing data to induce high
confidence misclassification on well-trained machine learning
classifiers [2]. The Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) attack is one
particularly fast, simple, and highly effective adversarial attack
algorithm, which relies on adding, according to the sign of
the cost function’s gradient, an l∞-bounded error to each
data sample resulting in high-confidence misclassification [3].
As a result of this vulnerability, several defenses have been
proposed for a variety of threat models to combat the FGS at-
tack. Yet, prior defenses are either computationally costly, lack
robustness in resisting misclassification at high perturbation
magnitudes, or both. This letter proposes a defense against the
FGS attack that mitigates its effects on deep learning classifiers
in a wide perturbation range while retaining computational
efficiency.
Although several types of adversarial attacks exist (see e.g.,
[4], [5], and [6]), this letter’s specific focus on defending the
FGS attack is twofold. First, the currently proposed state-of-
the-art defenses for combating this attack are computationally
inefficient whereas less costly algorithms lack accuracy in
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classification. In the scope of this letter, we aim to fill this
gap by devising a defense that is both computationally efficient
and robust in resisting misclassification. Second, more potent
adversarial attacks such as Projected Gradient Decent [4],
DeepFool [5], and the Carlini & Wagner Attack [6], are
iterative and require a longer implementation time than the
FGS attack. The consequential latency caused by these attacks
is more likely to result in tamper detection [7], in real-time,
and cause the corrupted sample to be rejected for classification.
The FGS attack, however, is fast to implement and more likely
to bypass latency measurements making it more desirable by
an attacker.
We examine the effectiveness of our proposed defense in
two defense-blind attack environments: the semi-white box
threat model, in which the attacker has full knowledge of
the target classifier’s architecture and parameters, and the
black box threat model in which the attacker is aware of the
classification task performed by the deep neural network but
unaware of the target model’s architecture and parameters. As
will be clear in the sequel, black box environments are not
necessarily less vulnerable than semi-white box environments
due to the transferability property of the FGS attack across
disparate classifiers [8]. Therefore, the effectiveness of our
proposed defense is tested in both scenarios.
It is important to note that prior work [9]-[10] has shown
differentiable pre-processing functions to be vulnerable to
further adversarial attacks (i.e., combining the defense with
the target model and using its resulting gradient to generate
an attack) in complete white box scenarios where the adversary
has full knowledge of the defense. Although such methods can
be circumvented in the white box scenario, the defense blind
environment is equally important to consider as rapid software
updates are capable of instantly changing the portion of the
computational framework responsible for defending the attack.
Therefore, unlike static Compact Disk software packages,
present day downloadable software is highly susceptible to
dynamic changes [11], which can instantly alter an adversary’s
knowledge about a system.
Related Work: The majority of algorithms proposed for
defending the FGS attack either rely on filtering, which con-
sists of subtracting the potentially added adversarial noise, or
dimensionality reduction, which consists of data compression.
Examples of filtering include using the output of a Denoising
AutoEncoder (DAE) (see e.g., [10] and [12]) and manifold
learning [13], which aims to detect corrupted samples by learn-
ing the distribution of the original uncorrupted training data
and eliminating outliers. Although filtering using the output of
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a DAE is effective in mitigating the FGS attack, it requires the
reconstruction of the input sample’s compressed representation
which is unnecessary, as we show in this work, not only
because similar robustness can be achieved against the same
attack using the compressed representation, but also because
the compressed representation could reduce the training time
of the defense. Furthermore, manifold learning has been shown
to be vulnerable to the FGS attack, as adversarial examples
may not appear as statistical outliers on the manifold of the
training data [14]. We show that using the output of the DAE’s
hidden layer representation results in better computational
efficiency and retains the effectiveness of the DAE output.
Dimensionality reduction defense algorithms, on the other
hand, include using Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
[15], traditional autoencoders [16], and a cascaded neural
network architecture [16] where the output of a DAE is input
into a traditional autoencoder, whose bottleneck layer is ex-
tracted to produce a reduced dimensional representation of the
input. PCA is computationally efficient but lacks robustness in
withstanding the FGS attack since it does not account for the
classification task, whereas the cascaded architecture proposed
in [16] serves as a robust defense but is computationally
costly as it not only requires an additional autoencoder to
be trained, but also reconstructs a compressed representation
within its algorithm. Our proposed defense is shown to be as
robust as the cascaded defense algorithm while reducing its
accompanied computational cost.
Another known defense strategy outside of the aforemen-
tioned categories of defense algorithms is adversarial retrain-
ing [17], where the target classifier is retrained with simulated
FGS attacks. Although adversarial retraining has worked as an
effective defense in certain scenarios, it has been shown to be
vulnerable to unforeseen black box attacks [18], even for very
small perturbation magnitudes. However, for completeness, we
compare our method to this widely proposed defense as well.
In this letter, we empirically show that using the output
of the hidden layer of a Denoising AutoEncoder (DAE)
is equivalently robust for defending the Fast Gradient Sign
adversarial attack in comparison to the state-of-the-art, and
requires much less computational power. We demonstrate the
efficacy of our defense in both the semi-white box and black
box scenarios.
II. METHODS AND SETUP
A. Datasets and Classifiers
The empirical analysis in this letter is conducted using
a supervised learning algorithm on two distinct ten-class
datasets: the MNIST dataset of hand written digits [19] and the
Fashion-MNIST dataset of fashion articles [20]. Both datasets
consist of 60,000 training samples and 10,000 disparate testing
samples of 28×28 gray scale images, denoted as x ∈ IRn.
Each sample image is normalized to lie in [0, 1]n, where
n = 28 × 28 = 784, and belongs to one of ten possible
classes, y ∈ {0, 1, ...9}, which are one-hot encoded. In the
MNIST dataset of hand written digits, each class corresponds
directly to the same valued digit (i.e. the class ‘0’ corre-
sponds to the digit ‘0’). In the Fashion-MNIST dataset, each
class corresponds to a different fashion article as follows:
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} = {top, trouser, pullover, dress, coat,
sandal, shirt, sneaker, bag, boot}.
The target classifiers selected for classifying both of the
foregoing datasets are identical in architecture. We use F (·) :
IRn → {0, 1}m, to denote the classifier, i.e., F (x) = yˆ,
where yˆ is the predicted class from the classifier. F (·) is
a fully connected artificial neural network with two hidden
layers; consisting of 100 units each. The number of dimensions
in the input is n = 28 × 28 = 784 and the number of
dimensions in the output is m = 10, which corresponds to
one of ten possible classifications for each sample. Each unit
in the hidden layers has a ReLU activation function and the
output is a softmax layer. Each classifier is optimized using
100 epochs of the Adam algorithm [21] and a cross-entropy
loss objective function. During training, each classifier uses a
batch size of 200 and a learning rate of 0.001.
B. Attack Method
In both the semi-white box and black box environments,
the adversary generates adversarial perturbations, denoted as
x˜, according to the following formulation:
x˜ = x+ η ∗ sign (∇xJ(w, x, y)) . (1)
In (1), x refers to the original input sample and
sign (∇xJ(w, x, y)) is the sign of the gradient of the cross-
entropy cost function J(w, x, y), which is a function of the
input, x, the output classification, y, and the classifier weights,
w. The parameter η is the l∞-bounded perturbation, where
η ≤ ‖x − x˜‖∞.
In the semi-white box threat model, the adversary has full
knowledge of F (·) and is able to use its loss function to
generate adversarial examples. However, in the black box
environment, the adversary is forced to train an estimate
model, denoted, G(·), which performs the same classification
task as F (·). In this case, the adversary will attempt to mimic
the behavior of the target classifier by constructing an artificial
neural network architecture that is well fitted to the available
training data. Therefore, G(·) is chosen to be a three-hidden-
layer fully connected artificial neural network with 200, 200,
and 100 units in each of its hidden layers, with respect to
order from the input to output layers, followed by a ten-
dimensional softmax output layer. We chose this architecture
for the attacker’s model as we found it to fit the training data
well. Then, the adversary uses the loss function of G(·) to
generate adversarial examples according to (1).
C. Defense Method
The defense consists of training a Denoising AutoEncoder
(DAE) which consists of an encoder p(x) = x′: IRn →
IRk, which compresses the n-dimensional input into a k-
dimensional representation (k < n), and a decoder q(x′) = xˆ:
IRk → IRn, which reconstructs an approximation of the orig-
inal n-dimensional input from the compressed k-dimensional
representation. To train the DAE, the FGS attack is simulated
on F (x) using η = 0.25 on 30,000 randomly selected training
samples and η = 0.50 on the remaining 30,000 training
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samples. The chosen bounds were empirically found to denoise
the adversarial noise most effectively in the experimented
perturbation range. The DAE is then trained to minimize the
mean squared error between the clean input and reconstructed
output:
Minimize
p,q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
(xi − q(p(x˜i))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣2. (2)
In addition to the 60,000 adversarial examples, the DAE is
also trained to map the uncorrupted 60,000 training samples to
their original representation to retain robustness in the absence
of an attack. Finally, the encoder, p(·), is used to transform
the training data and train a new classifier, f(·), of the same
architecture as F (·) but with a k-dimensional input. Thus, the
final defense for F (·) is f(p(·))
Finding the optimal number of dimensions, k, to reduce
the input data to is challenging and often dependent on the
dataset. In this study, we explored compressing the input data
to k dimensions, where k ∈ {16, 32, 47, 64, 80, 94, 157}. For
brevity, we have only included detailed results in this letter
for k = 47. However, our open source code1 contains results
for all explored rates.
III. RESULTS
We present the effectiveness of our defense at each per-
turbation magnitude by measuring the retained accuracy of
the defense. The retained accuracy is the portion of samples
that were correctly classified after the defense in relation to
the number of samples that were initially classified correctly
before the attack. Furthermore, we define the high SNR regime
when η < 0.25 and the low SNR regime when η > 0.25.
A. Effectiveness of Defense: MNIST Digit Dataset
1) Semi-white Box Results: In the semi-white box envi-
ronment for the MNIST digit dataset, compressing the input
sample to a 47-dimensional representation results in an av-
erage accuracy retention of 97.14% across the noise range
η ∈ [0.01, 0.50]. In comparison, the classifier is only able to
retain an average of 15.95% and 38.14% of its accuracy across
the same noise range when using no defense and adversarial
retraining, respectively. Furthermore, at high SNR, using the
hidden layer of the DAE provides an equivalently robust
defense in comparison to the DAE output and the cascaded
defense as shown in Fig. 1. However, the hidden layer defense
is nearly 2.43x more computationally efficient in comparison
to using the original n-dimensional representation as shown
in Table 1. Finally, at low SNR, the hidden layer defense
does result in a slight compromise in robustness, but this is
accompanied by much less computational power.
2) Black Box Results: In the black box threat model,
the DAE hidden layer defense achieves an average retention
accuracy of 75.86% in comparison to 19.16% and 31.16%
when using no defense and adversarial retraining, respectively,
for η ∈ [0.01, 0.50]. The robustness trend here, as shown in
Fig. 2, is similar to that shown in the semi-white box model
1Code has been accepted for publication at: https://codeocean.com/capsule/
8113806/tree/v1
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Fig. 1. The retained accuracy of the MNIST digit dataset in the semi-white
box environment for each tested perturbation magnitude.
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Fig. 2. The accuracy of the MNIST digit dataset in the black box environment
for each tested perturbation magnitude.
in that the DAE hidden layer defense is equivalently robust to
the DAE output and the cascade. However, the lower accuracy
retention in the low SNR regime for the black box scenario is
more apparent in comparison the semi-white box scenario.
B. Effectiveness of Defense: Fashion-MNIST Dataset
1) Semi-white Box Results: As shown in Fig. 3, at high
SNR, the DAE hidden layer defense is the most robust defense
against the FGS attack for the Fashion-MNIST dataset in
comparison to all other considered methods. As with the
MNIST digit dataset, the Fashion-MNIST classification task
experiences a slight compromise in accuracy in the low SNR
regime which is accompanied by a significant reduction in
computational cost. On average, the Fashion-MNIST classifier
is able to retain an accuracy of 85.52% for η ∈ [0.01, 0.50]
when using the DAE hidden layer defense, which slightly
outperforms the DAE output defense that attains an average
accuracy of 85.23% in the same noise range, but delivers
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Fig. 3. The accuracy of the Fashion-MNIST dataset in the semi-white box
environment for each tested perturbation magnitude.
slightly lower robustness than the cascade, which attains an
average accuracy of 89.34% for η ∈ [0.01, 0.50]. Each of the
foregoing defenses, however, significantly outperforms using
no defense and adversarial retraining, which retain 17.33% and
49.11% accuracy on average, respectively.
2) Black Box Results: In the black box threat model,
the DAE hidden layer defense is able to attain an average
retained accuracy of 63.30%, which is significantly greater
than the 26.47% average retained accuracy of the mismatched
attack without any defense. Similar to both threat models
for the MNIST digit dataset, the DAE hidden layer defense
outperforms, in terms of robustness, every other considered
defense strategy in the high SNR regime, as shown in Fig. 4.
However, the greater performance of the DAE hidden layer
is more prominent in the high SNR regime of the Fashion-
MNIST dataset in comparison to the high SNR regime of the
MNIST digit dataset. Unlike the previous setups, adversarial
retraining is able to retain an average accuracy of 63.06% for
η ∈ [0.01, 0.50], which is approximately equivalent to using
the DAE hidden layer defense. Although adversarial retraining
outperforms the DAE hidden layer defense at low SNR, the
latter defense is stronger in the high SNR regime where the
attack is visually imperceptible and more important to defend.
C. Effectiveness of Defense: Speedup
Each experimented reduced input cardinality results in a
significant speedup of over 2x in training the defense classifier,
f(·), in comparison to training the target classifier, F (·), con-
sisting of the initial 784-dimensional input. Table 1 shows the
training time and speedup for various compression rates with
the bold entries indicating the particular defense discussed
throughout this letter for the MNIST digit dataset. The defense
classifiers trained on the Fashion-MNIST dataset had almost
identical speedup factors as those shown in Table 1, which
was expected due to the classifiers’ identical architectures.
Although higher data compression results in greater speedup, it
does not necessarily result in overall robustness (i.e., reducing
input cardinality to k = 16 results in a speedup of 2.67x
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Fig. 4. The accuracy of the Fashion-MNIST dataset in the black box
environment for each tested perturbation magnitude.
TABLE I
TRAINING TIME AND SPEEDUPS ON MNIST DIGIT DATASET
Input
Cardinality (k)
Training Time
(s)
Speedup (x) Average
Accuracy (%)
784 120.67 - 96.16
157 57.91 2.08x 97.20
94 54.22 2.23x 96.83
80 52.44 2.30x 96.86
64 52.26 2.31x 97.09
47 49.60 2.43x 97.14
32 46.61 2.59x 95.54
16 45.27 2.67x 91.63
The training time for each classifier along with the average retained accuracy
for η ∈ [0.01, 0.50] when using the DAE output defense (k = 784), and
when using various number of dimensions for the input through the DAE
bottleneck layer as defense.
and an average accuracy of 91.63% whereas reducing to
k = 157 results in a greater average accuracy of 97.20% but
a slower speedup of 2.08x). Therefore, the optimal balance
between compression and robustness must be found before
implementing our proposed defense.
IV. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In the black box threat model, the gradient used to simulate
adversarial perturbations differs from the gradient of the
target classifier. As a result, the robustness of the defense is
decreased due to the defense being trained to specifically filter
adversarial noise proportional to the gradient of the target clas-
sifier. This trend is exemplified in Fig. 2, which in comparison
to the results of Fig. 1, shows lower retained accuracy at low
SNR. An adversary, as a result, can take advantage of this
vulnerability and choose to generate an attack on a substitute
model even if they have access to the target model. Upon
discovering the adversary’s new methodology, the defender
would adapt their defense to variously crafted attacks, and
this trend would continue alternating. In future work, we
anticipate investigating, from a game theoretic perspective,
how the knowledge held by the defender and attacker can give
either party an advantage in defending and crafting an attack.
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Algorithm 1 Attack Generator
Function: attack
Input: x, w, η, y
Result: x˜
∇xJ(w, x, y) = backpropagate(w, x, y)
x˜ = x+ η ∗ sign (∇xJ(w, x, y))
return x˜
Algorithm 2 Defense Generator
Input: xtrain, ytrain, wmodel
Result: wDAE , wdefense
x(0.25) = attack(xtrain, wmodel, 0.25, ytrain)
x(0.50) = attack(xtrain, wmodel, 0.50, ytrain)
wDAE = train DAE(xtrain, x
(0.25), x(0.50))
x′ = encoderwDAE (xtrain)
wdefense = train defense(x
′, ytrain)
return (wDAE , wdefense)
V. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A. Algorithms
The defense used in our experiments consists of a fully
connected multi-layer artificial neural network, which serves
as the Denoising AutoEncoder (DAE). It is trained with five
hidden layers containing 512, 256, k, 256, and 512 units, re-
spectively. The number of dimensions at the most compressed
hidden layer, denoted k, was used as an independent variable
reflecting the various compression rates that were explored.
Each DAE was trained using both clean and adversarial data,
which was generated according to Algorithm 1. The DAE,
which used no activation functions in its hidden layers and
used a sigmoid activation function at the output layer, was
optimized using the Adam algorithm with the mean squared
error objective function using 150 epochs, a batch size of 256,
and a learning rate of 0.001. During test time, all data was
propagated through the defense shown in Algorithm 3.
Every model was developed using the Keras Machine Learn-
ing package with a TensorFlow backend in Python, and the
FGS attack was implemented using the Cleverhans Python
package. We used an NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU with 16 GB
of memory for model training.
B. Datasets
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show three samples from the MNIST digit
dataset and the Fashion-MNIST Dataset, respectively, which
are each initially classified correctly and then misclassified
with high confidence upon the addition of an l∞ bounded
error of η = 0.10.
Algorithm 3 Real Time Defense
Input: xtest, wDAE , wdefense
Result: yˆ
x′test = encoderwDAE (xtest)
yˆ = classifywdefense(x
′
test)
return yˆ
Fig. 5. Example images from the MNIST digit dataset. Top row: original
samples correctly classified as 7, 2, and 1. Bottom row: adversarially perturbed
images now classified as 3, 1, and 8 with 100%, 99% and 100% confidence,
respectively.
Fig. 6. Example images from the Fashion-MNIST dataset. Top row: original
samples correctly classified as ankle boot, pullover, and trouser. Bottom row:
adversarially perturbed images now classified as sneaker, shirt, and coat; each
with 100% confidence.
